Abstract: We present the embodied appraisal theory of emotions and show how it handles a variety of intuitions we hold about affective states. While appreciating its integrative potential, we point out possible difficulties that it might face from further investigation of embodied non-emotional states. Following Darwin and his work on the expression of emotions, we suggest that some obviously non-emotional mental states comply with the criteria set by Prinz's theory. Therefore it is doubtful whether his definition of emotions is correct and whether perceptual approaches are useful in explicating the nature of emotion types.
Contenders
Alongside the two major contending theories that explain the nature of emotions, the current version of perceptual theory, as defended by Prinz (2004) , presents a very powerful and novel way of bringing forth the advantages of both views while eliminating their drawbacks at the same time. This paper explains how Prinz fares in respect to his predecessors and establishes what is new in his view, before presenting a new line of attack on his position. We will focus on the fact that his account might prove too much and that his criteria for determining the nature of emotions extend the emotion category beyond its intuitive limits.
Prinz starts off by criticizing the two major competing theories competitors in the field of philosophy of emotions. His primary target is cognitivism, though he is also critical of previous versions of perceptual theories. A major task for any philosopher of emotions is to offer a relatively simple definition of what emotions are and how they fit into the broader structure of our minds. This is no simple task as emotions seem to be too diverse to comply with a single definition. They can be short-lasting or very long-term (compare the time-frame of a brief shock from a possible danger that turns out not to be imminent with the love shared by two people in a healthy relationship), biologically anchored or culturally based (fear of spiders vs. guilt from neglecting one's religious obligations), very simple or extremely complex (joy from a sunny day vs. anxiety over whether yesterday's disappointing investment will impact on the company's annual profit), very strongly felt or almost exclusively attitudinal (a thrill ride on a roller-coaster vs. intellectual boredom). In addition to these various superficial properties, emotions also seem to consist of a variety of manifestations, including specific feelings, appropriate response tendencies, attitudes and bodily reactions. Yet in all this diversity, philosophers are looking for a unity that would encompass divergences and explain emotions as a single and well-defined category of mind.
A major theory that Prinz wishes to disassociate himself from is cognitivism. It is an approach that views emotions as hidden beliefs, judgments or appraisals. The cognitivist conviction is that behind the veil of feelings and visceral responses lies the real cognitive nature of emotional episodes. Cognitivism argues that every emotion consists of a specific propositional structure that an organism uses to evaluate certain situations or scenarios. It is these evaluations that make us react to emotions in given ways, that offer us a course of actions that are prototypical for each emotional type (Solomon 1976 , Nussbaum 2001 . According to cognitivists, a fear of heights might in fact be a judgment that heights are dangerous and love might be an appraisal that indicates that it is worth spending most of our time in the company of another person. There has been much criticism of cognitivist approaches and Prinz refers to this on pages 26-33 of his book. Having propositional structure requires the presence of appropriate concepts that emotions have to include in order to fulfill the criterion. If pride consists of the judgment that one has achieved something and should be valued more, then any subject that experiences a feeling of pride has to possess all the required concepts. However, it is far from clear that all the organisms that we normally ascribe emotions to are cognitively so robust that they are capable of possessing the required concepts. We speak of a dog being joyful about his master's return or a baby fearing that her mother is not coming back. Yet it is not very likely that the dog or the baby possesses all the component concepts-especially when concepts of the self and those of temporal or modal properties are involved. Also, cognitive theories have difficulty in explaining why emotions have bodily components. It seems a fairly undeniable claim that most emotional episodes are powerfully felt, with swift changes taking place in the body in a variety of forms. What would anger be without an increased heart rate, characteristic facial changes and clenched fists? Yet pure cognitivism has little to say on this issue. Claims that there are emotional episodes with little or no bodily component-even if true-cannot assuage a larger worry. Cognitivists are forced to construe some ad hoc story about how propositional components become linked up with respective bodily responses. One possible way is to categorize various alterations in the body as pre-conditions of the action tendencies that emotions elicit or tend to elicit. The other is to establish a connection with the body ex post, by making emotions larger conglomerate entities, consisting of both attitudes and visceral changes. The obvious disadvantage of any such account is the increased complexity of emotions as entities that fail to have a unified and simple structure. Instead they are viewed as clusters of various qualities that might or might not be present in varied strength. Another, more troublesome consequence of these mixed views is that potentially at least all emotions can be disembodied. If an organism arrives at the required judgment, yet the related bodily response fails to materialize, cognitivists owe us an explanation as to the mental characteristics of such a state. While reminiscent of hallucinations or cases of self-deception, these disembodied judgments have to face a challenge from an uncontested territory. It is very likely that one can arrive at any particular judgment under normal conditions without any implied action tendency, bodily reaction or inner feeling. Judgments in most cases are cold, purely attitudinal states that reflect our stance and they bear little relation to anything but other propositional attitudes. There is no obvious connection between propositional attitudes and feelings or bodily sensations. Cognitivists carry the burden of explaining the difference between standard beliefs and the very same beliefs that are entangled in (possibly disembodied) emotions.
With cognitive theories having been very much discredited, the alternatives must be examined. An influential alternative view is the perceptual theory which Prinz dismisses in its original form, yet eventually accepts in his own enriched version. The original idea behind the perceptual view radically differs from that of cognitivism. According to perceptual accounts, emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. This view was famously advocated by W. James and his contemporary C.G. Lange (Lange and James 1922) . According to these established theorists, intuition fails us when we believe that upon detection of an emotion elicitor we experience the appropriate emotion, followed by related changes in our bodies. Instead, the elicitor is detected, it provokes changes in the body and these are immediately detected. It is the detection of these visceral changes that amounts to experiencing emotions. Emotions are perceptions of bodily perturbations.
While this theory responds very well to cognitivist issues concerning the role of the body in emotional episodes, it introduces various problems of its own. In this respect, there is a specific asymmetry between perceptual and cognitive accounts. The characteristics of emotions that directly follow from one account are hard to explain according to the other and vice versa. For perceptualists, it is the intentional and normative properties of emotions that present the largest problem. If emotions detect bodily changes, it is a mystery how they can be directed at various objects outside the body. My episode of jealousy might be felt in response to my heart thumping and cheeks blushing, yet it is clearly directed at my partner, not at my body parts. In addition, very similar bodily changes may take place upon completion of a long run, but they are in no sense directed at anyone. Perceptual theorists owe us an explanation of the intentional character of emotions.
Analogous issues arise when we consider normative aspects of the use of emotion categories. It is perfectly reasonable to judge emotion episodes in normative terms. It is perfectly all right to fear heights, yet completely unreasonable to fear a harmless spider. Also, overly explicit expressions of joy might be inappropriate in certain situations. Perceptions, however, are normally not subject to such evaluations and it is not clear why this difference occurs with regard to the body.
Valent Embodied Appraisals
Prinz initially observes that in order to fully account for all characteristics of emotions, an explication that combines advantages of both the perceptual and cognitive perspectives is needed. However, a cognitive theory is a non-starter as its fundamental premise that emotions are veiled propositional attitudes does not withstand scrutiny. Therefore Prinz chooses to start from the perceptual account and amend it in such a way that it successfully accommodates various cognitivist intuitions. The core idea behind his embodied appraisal theory consists of the fact that contents of perceptual states do not have to be their proximal causes. From the fact that emotions are perceptions of bodily states, it does not follow that the content of an emotion has to be the given bodily state. Instead, bodily states might be indicative of events external to them. In cases of emotions, their set-up ensures that detection of the bodily states correlates with external events. A schema in which an event is made to correlate with a state of affairs can be understood in representative terms (Dretske 1989). Prinz thereby claims that the detection of bodily perturbation in fact represents states of affairs that correlate with bodily changes. This correlation is guaranteed by both natural and cultural selection. Upon careful examination of when and for what purpose bodily changes occur, Prinz comes up with a list of the core relation themes that emotions represent. The list is greatly influenced by Lazarus' (1991) cognitive appraisal account. They all pertain to the well-being of the organism with respect to its environment and its concerns, just as many cognitive theories argue. Thereby we arrive at an account that is both perceptual and intelligible in intentional terms, exactly in line with our intuitions. Joy can be directed at the lottery win, despite the fact that it is brought about by various bodily changes. The name of the theory is therefore self-descriptive. Emotions appraise the conditions of their bearer, yet they do so by detecting appropriate bodily perturbations.
Prinz is aware that such delineation cannot suffice for all aspects of our affective intuitions. While his theory has great potential in differentiating various emotion types and in explaining relations between bodily reactions and the objects of emotions, some categorization issues, as well as the notion of emotional intensity, call for additional consideration. It is a basic fact that we split emotions along an axis into positive and negative ones. They also vary in their intensity and their arousal level can alternate. The average intensity of being sad seems to be lower than that of happiness, not to speak of high arousal states such as being alarmed or astonished. The existence of such observable facts calls for the introduction of an additional element of valence into Prinz's theory. In order for embodied appraisals to qualify as emotions, they have to include valence markers. Their nature is not perceptual: "valence markers are internal commands to sustain or eliminate a somatic state by selecting an appropriate action" (ibid., 229). They present commands to continue or discontinue the state in which our bodies are in and also by their transitive outreach the extrasomatic state that brought about the currently perceived bodily condition. It is the valence that makes appraisals matter to us by way of forcing us to strengthen or weaken the states we find ourselves in. Without valence, emotions would only be sophisticated detectors with no influence on action tendencies.
With this complete picture in hand, Prinz considers various challenges to his view. Given the nature of his theory, he is especially concerned with perceived bodily states that fail to qualify as emotions. It is a truism that we have the ability to detect a variety of our internal perturbations. Episodes of hunger, thirst or pain are all outcomes of somatosensory organs that map internal changes and alert us to act in order to deal with these changes. Hunger detects an empty stomach in order to fill it up. It is therefore not only a perception of a particular bodily state, but it also includes a strong valence marker. The state of hunger is unpleasant and upon receiving this perceived information about its stomach, the organism has to overcome it. Therefore hunger and other bodily sensations seem to fulfill the definitional criteria put forward by Prinz exclusively for emotions. Yet these somatosensory states are never classified as affective and that causes problems for the theory. Prinz's answer to this challenge invokes the semantics of the perceptions in question. The difference between bodily sensations and emotions, despite them being valent bodily appraisals, lies in their representative properties. While bodily sensations refer exclusively to conditions of the body, emotions "involve bodily states, but they do not represent bodily states" (ibid.,190). Instead they illustrate the organism's well-being in the world. Emotions go beyond the body. Pain, fatigue or thirst consist of a perception of bodily changes and their unique role is to supplement information about internal changes. Their receptive and representative roles overlap as they stop at the level of the body. Emotions, on the other hand, detect bodily changes in order to let us know how we fare in the world. While valent and embodied bodily sensations do not appraise the situation the way emotions do.
Darwin and Bodily Expressions
This leads us to a point of contention. While Prinz's way of tackling challenges to his theory from the perspective of bodily sensations is admirable, it opens the door for another criticism. There might be other bodily changes that cannot be so easily dismissed. We think that some of Darwin's thoughts on the relations between body and emotion can be employed against the embodied appraisal account. Prinz himself repeatedly points to the early work of Darwin (1872) . In his view, "no one observed the connection between body changes and emotion better" than the father of evolutionary theory (2004, 6) . Despite the fact that Prinz owes a great deal to Darwin, we think that the father of evolutionary theory might also offer suggestive counterexamples to Prinz's account. A more detailed look at Darwin's contribution is therefore needed.
The book The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals has today achieved something of a paradoxical stardom status. It is often assumed to be among the earliest systematic inquiries into the topic of emotional expressions, yet most of its content is made up of polemical exchanges with largely forgotten forerunners of Darwin. So while Darwin took his contribution on emotions to be just another addition to the list of books on the same topic, many contemporary authors see him as a figure without whom the discipline would not have got off the ground. For most of the history of emotion research, the book was rarely read and even nowadays it leaves a slightly uneasy feeling in the informed reader. The uneasiness stems from problems in both the book's methodology and its content. From the present day perspective, the methodological difficulties are obvious. The evidence is often anecdotal, unsystematic and easily defeasible. The individual chapters on each emotion and its expression are unbalanced and the theoretical conclusions are supported with unequal amounts of evidence. It is not uncommon to see the author himself questioning his own evidence and the reader has a hard time picking up the underlying message.
Some of our concerns about Darwin's method can probably be extended to most scientific books of his era and the repeated and extensive flaws within the text do not undermine the radically novel approach Darwin offers in his book. His suggestion that we use cross-cultural and animal evidence to demarcate biological input in the domain is congenial and influential to this day.
Methodological issues notwithstanding, the book is also rightly criticized in terms of a lack of content. There is a general agreement that its most troubling feature is the complete absence of any theory on the emotions. Darwin focuses solely on expressive side of emotional phenomena. Given the absence of any debate about the nature of the emotions, he has a hard time including mental states that deserve to be on his list of investigated items. The well-known cases of emotion types are mixed with states that are not members of emotions category according to any standard account. Alongside his discussion of the most obvious types such as astonishment, anger or love, he also devotes a significant portion of his book to meditation, patience, devotion and determination. The latter group strikes us as being either completely outside of the emotion domain, or at best bordering it.
The reason for his over-inclusive approach can be easily discerned. It is precisely because Darwin's concern is predominantly with facial and bodily expressions that he finds it necessary to include these additional states on his list. Whenever there is a distinctive facial or somatic feature, there must be an emotion. The existence of distinctive expressive features for each of the studied states allows him to declare emotions far beyond our wild imaginations. He does not hesitate to claim that: "even insects express anger, terror, jealousy, and love by their stridulation" (2007, . Given Darwin's preoccupation with the expressive side and his frequent equivocation between emotions and expressions of emotions, such claims make certain sense. His argument for attributing emotion to the simplest organisms is quite simple. Since there are prototypical behaviors and sounds that insects emit or display under a variety of specific circumstances and differing expressions refer to differing internal states, insects must undergo appropriate internal changes. As these displays are related to behavior and situations that we can observe in humans, such as attack, copulation or escape, Darwin makes a shortcut and simply assumes that behavioral changes in low organisms must indicate the presence of the mental analogues of our states.
What Darwin does not realize is that his second premise, relating expressions to inner states is not fully explained and justified. Without it, any strong conclusion is premature. No such justification of this connection is found in his writings. It would require at least a gesture towards a theory of emotions and, as we have already indicated, this is simple absent from his inquiry.
On the other hand, we believe that Darwin's inclusion of non-emotional states on his list of investigated bodily changes that are routinely associated with mental states opens a possible line of attack against Prinz's theory.
As we have already shown, Darwin integrates less common states on his list of emotions because of their link to specific bodily expressions. Frowning is an example that Darwin uses extensively in Chapter 9. He first plays with the idea of calling corrugators (the facial muscles responsible for frowning) the muscles of reflection, but then he rightly observes that a person deep in thought might not express any specific facial movement (ibid., 222). Frowning must therefore be a response to a more specific form of reflection. Darwin suggests that its appearance is related to encountering "something difficult or displeasing…in a train of thought or in action" (ibid., 223). Any expert on contemporary theories of emotions would be inclined to see these remarks as pointing toward the general category of surprise that thinkers frequently include in their list of emotions. This would, however, be a mistake. Such categorization overlooks Darwin's concerns that there is hesitation over action and that frowning is associated with it. An interesting example of his is that of threading a needle (ibid., 224). Frowning often occurs while such an action is being performed and it clearly has little bearing on the emotional side of that activity.
These initial thoughts of Darwin on frowning are followed by a rather foolish evolutionary account of how frowning might have come about. Yet even in his unrestrained mode of adaptationist speculations, he makes several interesting observations that are legitimate to our concern. He illustrates his wild conjectures about how frowning is related to an improved sight capacity with a phenomenon that is both genuine and wide-spread: "we are apt to close [our eyes], when we reject a proposition, as if we could not or would not see it; or when we think about something horrible" (ibid., 227).
Darwin then ventures to discuss other examples of prototypical visceral behavior, associated with non-emotional mental states. He describes a "vacant expression of the eyes" evident when one is completely lost in thought, as well as actions such as beard pulling or raising the face that occur under similar circumstances (ibid., 228-9). Pouting when sulky (ibid., 232) and pursing the lips in moments of determination also come under his spotlight (ibid., 235)-this is where his example of threading a needle comes in handy again. Each of these mind/body scenarios is accompanied by a very provisional discussion of their origin and possible role, which are most likely false in the light of present day knowledge. However, the sole message that we want to take from Darwin's extensive discussion is that there are well-documented cases of bodily expressions of mental states that are not related to emotions.
Non-emotional Bodily Changes
We have taken this longer detour concerning Darwinian endeavors into uncontested territory with the clear intention of bringing it back to our reading of Prinz. We claim that if some of Darwin's observations about bodily reactions and associated non-emotional mental episodes are correct, they present a potentially threatening objection to Prinz's account.
Let us recall that in his theory emotions are embodied appraisals with valence. It is not at all unlikely that at least some of Darwin's examples fit the definition, though their categorization within the types of emotions is problematic. As Prinz defines emotions with the help of two components (embodied appraisals and valence), we should rate Darwin's examples against both of them. Let us first concentrate on valence. In Prinz's theory, valence is an internal command to either abandon or continue the activity one is involved in. Some examples from Darwin's list have great valence-both frowning in difficult situations and pursing the lips in moments of determination point to an element of sustainability. In other cases, the valence is less obvious, though it could be reconstructed. Loss of thought and sulkiness are states from which we wish to escape. Their valence is therefore negative, though the precise nature of the internal command might be more difficult to construct than in the cases of clear determination. We therefore see no difficulty locating valence in Darwinian examples.
Finding the second element of embodied appraisals in the above-mentioned cases is more difficult. It is obvious that all the examples involve the body. There are visceral changes associated with loss of thought, determination or sulkiness. Yet the presence of bodily changes necessitates appraisals. For that we need to move beyond the body, to evaluate the well-being of an organism in its environment. Fortunately, what is also evident is that the states under discussion are significantly different from the perceived bodily changes that concern the body. Unlike hunger, thirst or pain, pouting and frowning are indicative of something beyond the body-otherwise Darwin would not have included them in his list. Frowning appraises a situation as being disruptive to our goals, pursing the lips indicates our determination and pouting signifies that the bearer is annoyed.
Prinz could argue that correlating visceral changes with non-emotional mental states does not show that we are informed about being in those states via perceived changes and therefore the states of determination or loss of thought are not to be handled by perceptual theory. Instead, observed bodily correlations might be mandatory, but inessential components of mental states that are detected by other methods (say, introspection). This answer, however, resembles a cognitivist remedy of the problem of visceral changes. It is simply not enough to argue that a bodily change accompanies a certain mental state. We need to know more about the connection as it seems to be a natural component of the state in question (just try to feel determined with an open mouth!) It therefore remains a serious possibility that visceral changes are more than fellow travelers of various non-emotional mental states. What is required is further investigation into how their perception contributes to one's awareness of being in the corresponding state. The real question is whether vacant eyes are a consequence of being lost in thought or indeed the detection of such bodily states informs one about one's oblivion to the outside world. While this suggestion might not initially be very appealing, it is not entirely impossible that a wake-up moment that allows a person to discontinue such a state might be brought about by an internal feedback loop which monitors the eye movement.
Detecting our own frowning face might very well inform us that we are determined about something and a sudden closure of the eyes might indicate the rejection of a certain thought. Whether these states are detectable by purely mental means remains an open question that has to be investigated experimentally.
Concluding Remarks
As Darwin has shown, non-emotional mental states have prototypical facial and bodily components. They often include valence to retain or reject a current state and they are also indicative of affairs outside of the body. They therefore seem to fall into the category of valent embodied appraisals that Prinz defines as essential for emotions. If it can be demonstrated that the perception of these bodily states informs an organism about the state it is in with respect to certain concerns, then the category of embodied appraisals does not coincide with the folk category of emotions. Different options are available to the defender of Prinz's perceptual account. One is to bite the bullet and simply include states such as being lost in thought, determination or sulkiness in the circle of emotions. This step, while theoretically justified, would collide with our pre-theoretical intuitions as to what emotions are. If the role of philosophy is to clarify ordinary concepts and give them the weight of wellestablished categories, this route is inadvisable.
The other, more radical step is to reject embodied appraisal theory as a good account of emotions. It might be a good theory of a wider mental category, but it fails to delineate emotions from other non-emotional states. The fact that Prinz and other theoreticians do not discuss similar counterexamples seems to stem from an overall neglect of the body in philosophy. We have learnt to be great observers of what is going on in our minds and are 1 The work on this publication was generously supported by the grant KJB900090802 of the Grant Agency of the Slovak Academy of Sciences.
only slowly starting to appreciate the bodily component of mental processes. With science and philosophy slowly opening up this domain, new integrative approaches are needed and the simple association of emotions with embodied appraisals might not be enough. 
